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The government intertemporal budget constraint states that all public liabilities have to be 
financed by either current or future generations. The generational accounting approach 
incorporates the expected demographic development and the parameters of the current fiscal 
policy into the intertemporal government budget constraint. By contrast with the public debt 
and deficit, the indicators based on generational accounting are forward looking and provide us 
with additional information about the current fiscal policy. To assess the sustainability of public 
budgets we constructed the first set of generational accounts for the Czech Republic. We found 
that a representative living agent obtains more benefits than he/she pays in taxes in 2004, i.e. 
the generational account of this representative agent is negative. In addition, the total amount of 
the government liabilities resulting from the current fiscal policy pursued to 2150 reaches about 
300% of GDP in 2004. Finally, the costs of postponed adjustment of government revenues and 
expenditures seem to be considerable. We conclude that the present fiscal policy is not 
sustainable, i.e. public budgets in the Czech Republic should be stabilized by changing the 
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Nontechnical Summary 
The government intertemporal budget constraint states that all public liabilities have to be 
financed by either current or future generations. Since the size and the structure of these 
generations vary over time, even unchanged fiscal policy can generate a different per capita 
lifetime burden of a representative current and future agent. The generational accounting approach 
incorporates the expected demographic development and the parameters of the current fiscal 
policy into the intertemporal government budget constraint. Afterwards, based on this 
methodology, different indicators of fiscal sustainability are derived. By contrast with the public 
debt and deficit, these indicators are forward looking and provide us with additional information 
about the current fiscal policy. 
Unlike the previous studies of fiscal sustainability in the Czech Republic, the generational 
accounting approach captures sustainability from both the aggregate macroeconomic and 
representative agent’s point of view. In our analysis both the residual and the sustainability 
approaches were implemented. We found no effect of different values of the discount rate, labour 
productivity growth and combinations thereof on the main results of our analysis. A representative 
living agent obtains more benefits than he/she pays in taxes in 2004, i.e. the generational account 
of this representative agent is negative. By contrast, a representative agent not yet born will face 
the opposite situation. Thus, the present fiscal policy is not sustainable, owing to the unequal 
treatment of current and future representative agents. In addition, if the discount rate equals 5% 
and productivity grows at 2% per year, we quantified the total amount of the government 
liabilities resulting from the current fiscal policy pursued to 2150 at about 300% of GDP in 2004. 
Thus, taking into account future demographic development and a strict indexation rule, the fiscal 
policy appears to be unsustainable. Finally, we found the costs of postponed adjustment of 
government revenues and expenditures to be considerable and rising over time. 
To summarise, we found the system of revenues and expenditure in the Czech Republic to be 
facing structural problems. So, even when the discount rate and labour productivity growth are set 
propitiously, the system of public finances remains unsustainable. In addition, the negative impact 
of demographic changes will aggravate the development of public finances in the future. 
According to the present analysis, the public budgets in the Czech Republic should be stabilized 
by changing the current system of taxes and benefits to reflect potential demographic 
development.  
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1. Introduction 
The government provides a number of public services and commodities, such as health care, 
education, infrastructure etc. Some people take advantage of consuming them more than others. 
For example, education expenditures are aimed mainly at young people, while older people do not 
take advantage of the public education system at all. By contrast, pensioners receive retirement 
pensions which are not addressed at young people, etc. Since public services and commodities are 
consumed differently through the lifespan, it follows that the amount of public expenditure is 
affected by the size and structure of the population. 
At the same time, all expenditures have to be financed. The main part of government revenues 
comes from taxes and wealth sales. Unfortunately, government wealth is limited in general, i.e. 
privatization revenues are at the government’s disposal to only a limited extent. Usually other 
revenue sources are also restricted.
1 Thus, the major part of expenditures has to be financed by 
taxes. This means that agents finance public services (commodities) indirectly through taxes. As 
in the case of expenditures, the total amount of public revenues depends on the size and the 
structure of the population.  
Generally speaking, people pay taxes and receive benefits according to their position in the life 
cycle. If we divide society into three age groups (young, middle-aged, old), then only the middle-
aged pay more into the public budgets than they receive. By contrast, the young and the old 
contribute to the public budgets to a very limited extent. Thus, a representative agent of a certain 
age is either a net contributor or a net beneficiary. This idea comes from the life cycle hypothesis.
2 
From our point of view it is important that people pay taxes and receive transfers differently over 
their lifespan. Based on these arguments, it follows that the size and structure of the population 
decisively affect the balance of public budgets.  
In fact, the government does not have to pay all its expenditure immediately using just tax 
revenues and privatization receipts. Where the government’s expenditures exceed its revenues, it 
takes out a loan or issues bonds. Still, these obligations will have to be repaid one day. From the 
generational point of view this means that the use of alternative ways of financing results in shifts 
in the financial burden from current to future generations, i.e. so-called ‘intergenerational 
redistribution’. Thus, current fiscal policy affects the net wealth not only of generations alive at 
present but also of generations not yet born.  
Unfortunately, neither the commonly used public budget deficit nor public debt records any 
intergenerational shifts or the way in which current fiscal policy influences the net wealth of a 
representative current and future agent. One of the tools which can be used to assess 
intergenerational balance or imbalance is so-called ‘generational accounting’. This approach 
reflects the long-term implications of current fiscal policy arrangements for intergenerational 
redistribution and fiscal sustainability taking into account the expected demographic development. 
Thus generational accounting can provide us with additional information about the current state of 
                                                           
1 Although seigniorage can be an important part of public revenue, we do not include it in our analysis. This 
reflects the Czech reality. In the past the Czech National Bank (CNB) did not transfer seigniorage to the 
government because it was making losses. Moreover, since the CNB has accumulated a large stock of debt, the 
same fact holds for the near future. 
2 See Modigliani (1963). 4   Kamil Dybczak  
 
fiscal policy and its potential implications next to the standard fiscal indicators. This methodology 
was developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff in 1991. The main issue was to quantify the 
impact of a government policy on the net wealth of current and future generations. As a result, the 
tool is used as an instrument for assessing the sustainability of the current settings of public 
finances taking into account the expected demographic development.  
It is important to note that generational accounts do not provide the exact level of future 
government deficits. This is definitely not a forecasting tool. The goal is to compare the present 
value of the growth-adjusted lifetime burden faced by a representative current and future agent on 
condition that the intertemporal budget constraint holds. Alternatively, it is possible to calculate 
the total amount of the government liabilities stemming from the current fiscal policy proceeds 
indefinitely. Moreover, alternative scenarios could help to identify potential ways of improving 
the intergenerational imbalance. The sustainability of various tax and expenditure variants could 
be assessed by the same token.  
The classical generational accounting methodology evaluates taxes and transfers as monetary 
flows. Alternatively, generational accounts can be defined as a utility balance that results from the 
interaction between individuals and the public sector. In this case we would have to assess the 
individual’s utility (disutility) of each component of net taxes over time. In our study we follow 
the monetary approach, since deciding on the utility of each public item seems very speculative. 
There is some criticism of the generational accounting methodology from both the theoretical and 
practical points of view.
3 We would like to stress that generational accounting is not a 
generational equilibrium model based approach, but just an indicator based on a trend projection. 
On the contrary, this projection is elaborate, introducing some economic theory and expected 
demographic development. Using the generational accounting methodology we can infer what 
situation would arise if the present fiscal policy stayed unchanged provided that the rest of the 
economy does not react. The results can identify the intergenerational redistribution which would 
result from the government’s current financing and spending decisions.  
The purpose of this paper is to assess the sustainability of the present fiscal policy in the case of 
the Czech Republic using the generational accounting methodology. Whereas generational 
accounts have been widely used for more than a decade worldwide, this is the first version of the 
generational accounts for the Czech Republic.
4 Some authors have improved the generational 
accounts method, but we present more or less the original version without applying any special 
technique. In what follows, sections 2, 3 and 4 review the standard methodological framework of 
generational accounting. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework of generational 
accounting. The third section specifies the variables and the parameters necessary to calculate the 
generational accounts of the current generations. Section 4 presents two main methods of 
assessing fiscal sustainability. In sections 5, 6 and 7, applied data and empirical results are 
presented. 
 
                                                           
3 See, for example, Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1994), who provide an extensive response to the critique 
of the method of generational accounting. 
4 An overview of the application of generational accounting in different countries is provided by Auerbach, 
Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1998).  Generational Accounts in the Czech Republic   5 
 
2. Intertemporal Public Budget Constraint 
The government intertemporal budget constraint says that the present value of current and future 
government revenues has to be equal to the sum of the present value of current and future 
government purchases and the level of net debt. In other words, net public debt Dt plus the present 
value of all net government purchases Gt,y have to be financed by the present value of the lifetime 
net taxes Nt,k paid by both current and future generations. Put formally, the government 
intertemporal budget constraint is stated as follows:  
 
                     (1) 
 
where Gt,y stands for the present value of year y net public purchases in period t (base year).
5 Gt,y 
is calculated as the present value of the difference between public expenditures and revenues not 
affected by the size of the population. Dt is defined as the public debt in year t less the present 
value of expected privatization revenues.
6 Finally, Nt,k denotes the present value of net taxes 
which will be paid through the life cycle by agents born in year k.
7 It is obvious that the first item 
on the left hand side corresponds to the sum of the present values of all net taxes paid by currently 
living agents from now to the end of their lives. The second item on the left hand side tallies with 
the cumulative present value of lifetime net taxes of agents not yet born. The following section 
discusses all the variables step by step.
8 Contrary to Gt,y, Nt,k denotes the present value of the 
difference between public revenues and expenditures affected by the size of the population. The 
distinction between public revenues and expenditures whose development is or is not affected by 
the size of the population is a standard procedure for generational accounting construction.  
3. Specifications and Projections of Variables and Parameters 
3.1 Lifetime Net Taxes of Current Generations 
The standard concept of generational accounting draws a line between the current and future 
generations. In the great majority of applied studies, generational accounts are constructed as a 
forward-looking indicator. This means that we reflect only the current and expected development 
of population size and structure. It follows that the total net taxes of currently living generations in 
present terms do not take into account the development of taxes and transfers before the base 
                                                           
5 All the fiscal data (Gt,y, Dt and total Nt,k) come from GFS 2004 (consolidated public budgets). For details see 
Appendix I. 
6 Sometimes government net wealth Wt is used instead of net public debt, with the opposite sign. Because of the 
lack of data on government net wealth in the Czech Republic we prefer the variable Dt. Arguments can be found 
in section 5.4. 
7 The symbolism is similar to Bonin (1997). Another, probably widely used, specification comes from Auerbach, 
Kotlikoff and Liebfritz (1998). 













k t D G N N ,
1
, ,6   Kamil Dybczak  
 
year.
9 Put differently, since generational accounts are constructed as a forward-looking indicator 
we do not cover the development of net taxes over the whole lifecycle for all currently living 
generations. In fact, the only current generation which we follow over the whole lifespan is the 
youngest one, i.e. the one born in the base year t.
10  
The current generations are defined as all agents who live in the present. Let t be the base year and 
L be the maximum length of life, then current agents were born between t-L and t. Thus, the 
present value of all net taxes paid by currently living agents is quantified over the period from t to 
t+L, i.e. until the youngest agent (born in the base year t) from the current generations dies. The 
first term on the left hand side in (1) can be expressed as: 
 
                                      (2) 
 
where Pi,k is the number of people born in k and still living in i. Next, ti,k represents the absolute 
level of the net taxes paid in period i by a representative agent born in k. The discount rate r 
converts future net taxes to the base year. We presume that r is constant over the whole period.  
To quantify the total net taxes of currently living generations in present terms, according to 
formula (2), we need a projection of demographic development as well as the projection of the net 
taxes paid in period i by a representative agent born in year k. On the one hand, the demographic 
projection is usually received from the national statistical office or other institution and accepted 
as it is. On the other hand, the base-year age-specific per capita taxes and transfers t
l
i,k of type l are 
projected by applying the constant (time invariant) growth rate g.
11 It is usually assumed, for 
projection purposes, that the growth rate g should reflect labour productivity growth, i.e. age- and 
gender-adjusted per capita taxes and transfers grow at the rate of labour productivity. Thus, 
applying constant g does not alter the shape of the particular average absolute tax and transfer age 
profiles. It follows that the share of the corresponding items in the income of a representative 
agent of the same age and gender is constant over time, i.e. all individuals of the same age and 
gender face the same lifetime net tax rate.
12 t
l
i,k can be calculated for different k in each year i 
using the formula (4). 
 
                                                        (3) 
 
                                                           
9 Gokhale J., Page B. (1997) calculated total net taxes of all current generations taking into account demography 
together with taxes and benefits also before the base year. 
10 Later in this section we will show that this is the only generation out of the currently living population whose 
generational account will be used for evaluating the sustainability of the current fiscal policy. 
11 Just as in the case of r we assume g to be constant over the whole period, but alternative scenarios are 
presented in section 6. 
12 Introducing this assumption seems to be the standard approach to generational accounts. By contrast, 
reflecting potential changes in age-specific profiles as a result of population ageing could make the projections 
more reliable. 
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i,k is positive (negative) then the item represents a tax (transfer) paid (obtained). We 
should stress that the key lies in deciding what taxes and transfers are influenced by the number of 
people and the age structure of the population.
14 It seems almost impossible to specify the 
components of net taxes precisely, since both the revenue and expenditure sides of the public 
budgets contain a wide variety of items. For some of them it is hard to decide which group they 
should belong to. Thus a close examination of the individual items is necessary.  
Finally, aggregating all the taxes and transfers of type l, we get the absolute net taxes of a 




                                                                 (4) 
 
It is worth noting that neither in the residual approach nor in the sustainability approach
16 is the 
total present value of the net taxes of the current generations restricted. Whatever approach we 
choose, the total present value of the net taxes of the current generations is quantified using the 
same procedure, i.e. formula (2) is applied. 
3.2 Generational Accounts of Current Generations 
The length of the remaining lifespan (k+L-t) of currently living agents varies in the base year 
because of different k. Thus, the present values of the remaining lifetime net taxes of currently 
living generations born in k, defined as Nt,k, are not directly comparable among themselves. But it 
is possible to compare the net taxes in present value terms of a representative agent of age i-k in 
the base year t. Finally, we define a year t account of a generation born in k as the present value of 
taxes paid minus the present value of transfers obtained throughout the rest of the life divided by 
the number of agents in the base year t. Generational accounts for different k are calculated 






                                          (5) 
 
 
The expression Pi,k/Pt,k in formula (5) represents the ratio of the population born in k and still alive 
in i to the base year t, i.e. it can be called a survival probability. Since the population dies out, it is 
clear that Pi,k<Pj,k where i>j.
17 Using equation (2) we can present the generational account 
equivalently as shown in formula (6). Put differently, the generational account stands for the 
present value net taxes of a representative agent born in k and still living in t.  
                                                           
13 Section 5 provides a detailed description of the different types of taxes and transfers. The data used for 
estimation purposes are described as well. In addition, Appendix II presents figures of different t
l. 
14 The inputs to the generational accounts will be discussed in section 5. 
15 Taxes are treated in positive terms and transfers in negative terms. 
16 Both the residual and sustainability approaches are discussed in detail in section 4. 
17 This effect can be mitigated by migration. 
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where Nt,k represents the present value of the lifetime net taxes which are paid by individuals born 
in k and still living in the base period t. 
Identically to the end of the preceding subsection, we would like to note that the quantification of 
the generational accounts of currently living generations is not influenced by the following either 
residual or sustainability approach. 
3.3 Government Purchases 
It should be pointed out that Gt,y has a different meaning than government consumption in the 
national accounts. According to the generational accounts methodology, Gt,y is defined as the 
balance of expenditure and revenue items which do not count towards net taxes. In other words, 
Gt,y is composed of revenues and expenditures whose size does not depend on the size of the 
living population. The projection method of government purchases is similar to the one discussed 
before in relation to the projection of age-specific tax and transfer profiles. The projection is even 
simpler, because it is not necessary to estimate the amount relating to the specific age group. The 
total amount is projected using the similar growth rate g as in the case of the age-specific tax and 
transfer profiles. 
4. Intergenerational Imbalance and Fiscal Sustainability Appraisal 
The theoretical concept of generational accounting is widely accepted. But there are several ways 
of constructing generational accounts. Many countries now publish their generational accounts 
complete with the methodology used. The main idea is uniform, but important partial differences 
can still be found. To assess the intergenerational imbalance (sustainability of public finances), 
different indicators based on the generational accounting methodology can be constructed. In the 
following sections, two major approaches will be discussed – the residual and the sustainability 
approach. But alternative ways can also be applied.
18 
4.1 Residual Approach and Generational Accounts of Future Generations 
The present fiscal situation can be resolved by introducing alternative adjustments. First, the net 
taxes of the present agents can be modified. Second, the government has the possibility of 
reducing the actual and potential level of its purchases. Third, the government might not want to 
solve the unfavourable situation immediately, i.e. it can defer solving the problem to the future. 
As a consequence, the total net taxes of future agents are implicitly increased. In the residual 
approach we assume that the government is not willing to change the current settings of the 
system for the time being. As a result, all the changes needed to attain fiscal sustainability will be 
faced by future generations. 
                                                           
18 For example, Cardarelli, Sefton and Kotlikoff (1999) consider a necessary change in government purchases or 
a change in the specific net tax rate to close the sustainability gap as alternative indicators of intergenerational 
imbalance/fiscal sustainability. Generational Accounts in the Czech Republic   9 
 
The residual approach proceeds in the following steps. First, the total present value of the net 
taxes of all currently living agents is calculated, applying no constraint on its value, using formula 
(2). Second, the present value of expected net public debt and net public purchases is calculated. 
Finally, the intertemporal budget constraint is applied to calculate the sum of the present value of 
the net taxes of future agents. Since the intertemporal budget constraint must hold, the sum of the 
present value of the net taxes of all future generations is calculated as a residual, as presented in 
equation (7). Hence in the residual approach all fiscal parameters have already been fixed except 
the ones which influence the total present value of the net taxes of future generations. This is the 
only variable which can vary. Put differently, a current fiscal policy that improves current agents’ 
wealth will ceteris paribus burden future generations in the negative direction, and vice versa. 
 
             (7) 
 
The size and structure of future generations vary over time. In addition, labour productivity is 
increasing. Thus, it is not possible to directly compare the absolute levels of the present value of 
the total lifetime net taxes of the currently living and future generations as calculated using 
formulas (2) and (7). Indeed, we have to reflect expected demographic development as well as the 
growing labour productivity if we want to compare the fiscal burden which will be faced by a 
representative current and future agent.  
We have already presented the way in which the generational accounts of currently living 
generations are computed using formula (5) or (6). There is only one current generation which we 
follow over the whole lifespan, i.e. the youngest one. Its generational account (GA
CUR
t,t ) will be 
compared with the generational accounts of future generations. 
There are few ways of calculating future generational accounts. Usually the generational accounts 
of future agents are assumed to be equal except for a productivity growth adjustment.
19 Taking 
into account these assumptions the generational account of a representative future agent is 
calculated as follows: 
 
 
                          (9) 
 
 




k,k) reflect the expected 
lifetime growth-adjusted net tax payments of a representative agent discounted to the base year, 
they are directly comparable. 
In the residual approach, the condition for examining the sustainability of a particular fiscal policy 
is based on comparing the growth-adjusted net taxes of current and future representative agents. It 
follows that different treatment of current and future generations from the point of view of the net 
taxes of a representative agent is a criterion for deciding about the size and direction of the 
                                                           
19 Unfortunately, introducing the above assumptions, the residual approach does not enable us to express 
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intergenerational redistribution. In other words, comparing the value of GA
CUR
t,t  and GA
FUT
k,k 
reflects the intergenerational shifts necessary to sustain public budgets. It means that when 





k,k), is called intergenerationally imbalanced. Because intergenerational shifts are 
necessary to ensure the validity of the intertemporal budget constraint, such a fiscal policy is also 
called unsustainable. Looking at the problem from the other perspective, we see that a sustainable 





4.2 Sustainability Approach 
The sustainability approach looks at current and future generations in the same manner. This 
means that the total lifetime net taxes of current and future generations are constructed using the 
same procedure, i.e. using formula (2) and its modification for future generations. Consequently, 
the total lifetime net taxes of all generations are constructed without applying the intertemporal 
budget constraint. The sustainability approach takes into consideration the overall demographic 
development of all generations.  
The sustainability approach slightly modifies the budget constraint. The items of the budget 
constraint in formula (10) are constructed in the same way as in the residual approach except for 
the sum of the total present value of net taxes of future generations. The criterion of fiscal 
sustainability is the so-called ‘sustainability gap’.
20 It is defined as the total amount of the 
government liabilities resulting from the current fiscal policy pursued indefinitely, i.e. the 
imbalance in the intertemporal budget constraint. Alternatively, the sustainability gap equals the 
total present value of lacking public revenues which is desired to fulfil the intertemporal public 
budget constraint. On the one hand, if the sustainability gap is positive the present value of all 
potential public expenditures exceeds the present value of all public revenues. Thus, the gap 
shows the size of the liabilities that the government will have to redeem. On the other hand, a 
negative sustainability gap indicates a government intertemporal surplus and the option of 
reducing net taxes. 
 
 
                                         (10) 
 
where  N’t,k indicates the total present value of the net taxes of future agents resulting from 
pursuing the present fiscal policy indefinitely. Because the sustainability approach does not 
distinguish between current and future generations, we can simulate the impact of a tax or a 
transfer on both living and future generations. But at the same time, by contrast with the residual 
approach, we know nothing about intergenerational redistribution.  
Since the absolute present value of the sustainability gap is hard to interpret, it is recommended to 
relate the sustainability gap to GDP. This ratio can be used for international comparison. As in the 
previous approach the final result should not be used as a forecast of public indebtedness. 
 
                                                           
20 It is possible to find other names for this indicator; for example, Cardarelli, Sefton and Kotlikoff (1999) call it 
the ‘intertemporal budget gap’. 
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5. General Data Description 
In creating generational accounts for the Czech Republic, we follow the standard procedure. The 
empirical evaluation of the intertemporal budget constraint requires projections of population, 
taxes, transfers, government purchases and the initial value of net public debt. At the same time 
the value of parameters g and r has to be set. We start with the 2004 data. The main data sources 
used are the FoS UK (Faculty of Sciences, Charles University, Prague) population projection
21 the 
CZSO (Czech Statistical Office) household budget survey and the MF (Ministry of Finance) 
government financial statistics. 
5.1 Demography 
Generational accounting is based on a long-term population projection, i.e. demography plays a 





k,k) are defined as per capita net taxes in present terms, the value is influenced 
by the size of the generation. Since the size of future generations is expected to fall in the coming 
decades, the total amount of net taxes Nt,k is divided by a smaller number Pk,k. In other words, the 
accumulated public debt will have to be financed by a smaller number of people. In addition, the 
structure of the population critically influences the absolute amount of net taxes. 
The original idea presented in the previous sections assumes that all government obligations have 
to be financed over an infinite time horizon. In practice it is not realistic to project all the 
necessary data to infinity. It is presumed that a nearly 150-year time horizon is long enough.
22 
There are important differences between males and females. Women live longer than men on 
average, but there are other distinctions which significantly affect the generational accounts. For 
example, due to wage discrimination, the wage of the average woman is not as high as that of the 
average man, so direct taxes and social security contributions are also different. In addition, the 
amount of indirect taxes differs as a result of the different consumption behaviours of the two 
genders.  
5.2 Age-Specific Revenues and Expenditures
23 
The main part of the revenue and expenditure age profiles was taken from the Household Budget 
Survey 2002. In our particular case we constructed age-specific profiles just using year 2002 data. 
First, it is difficult to acquire and treat the data. Second, we believe that a change in age-specific 
profiles needs strong incentives and moreover takes more years. Thus, we found no major flaws 
using just one year observations. The raw data is rather erratic, but a still apparent age-specific 
profile can be recognized. Following the generational accounting literature and trying to make our 
analysis and figures more tractable we filtered all the data using an HP filter. Again, the filtering 
does not influence the results of our analysis. After that, the relative age profiles were calculated 
and recalculated to fit the actual budget data.
24 
                                                           
21 Burcin B. and Kučera T. (2004).   
22 Thanks to discounting, the present value of all variables beyond this period is negligible. 
23 Bonin (1997) shows that using terms ‘Age-specific’ and ‘Non-age-specific’ could be misleading. We 
acknowledge this argument, but continue using them because of their broad utilization. 
24 For detailed information, see Appendix II – Age-Specific Taxes and Transfers 12   Kamil Dybczak  
 
We are conscious of the fact that many important relations proposed by the economic theory are 
neglected when constructing generational accounts. Nevertheless, we did not apply any 
sophisticated projection method. Instead, we projected all net taxes using formula (4) presented in 
the previous section. Once more, we would like to stress the role of generational accounts as a 
ceteris paribus indicator of intergenerational imbalance and fiscal sustainability.  
There is uncertainty about future productivity growth and the discount rate. Moreover, it is hard to 
choose specific values for r and g. So, we introduced a set of both parameters into our empirical 
analysis. This seems to be the standard approach to generational accounting in order to show the 
sensitivity of the results to adjustment in the values of g and r. The value of r is influenced by the 
government revenues and expenditure risk, which is hard to judge from today’s perspective.
25 In 
the case of labour productivity growth we mainly took into account long-run factors and the 
convergence of the Czech economy to the EU average. We calculated generational accounts for 
current and future generations and the sustainability gap using variant g (0.01, 0.02, 0.03) and r 
(0.03, 0.05, 0.07). 
5.2.1 Revenues 
Using the 2004 GFS methodology the total government revenues (expenditures) amounted to 
CZK 1,062 (1,160) billion. The ratio of age-specific revenues (expenditures) to total revenues 
(expenditures) is about 94 (87) %.
26 
For the empirical evaluation of the generational accounts, gathering the age-specific profiles of 
taxes and transfers of both genders is necessary. Taxes and transfers are broken down into several 
categories. First, public revenue and expenditure items, whose size depends on the number and 
age of people, have to be identified. In the case of the Czech Republic the following revenue 
items have been chosen:  
  Value Added Tax (VAT) (19.3%)
27 
  Excises (E) (9%) 
  Personal Income Tax (PIT) (12.6%) 
  Social Security Contributions (SSC) (36.6%) 
  Inheritance Tax (IT) (1.4%) 
  Corporate Income Tax (CIT) (11.3%) 
  Other Age-Specific Revenues (OR) (3.7%) 
 
Second, all public budget revenue items are assigned to individual age groups on the basis of the 
Household Budget Survey 2002. The only exception is Corporate Income Tax, which is treated 
like a tax on labour income (Personal Income Tax), i.e. the relative age profiles of both personal 
and corporate income taxes are identical.
28 The idea behind this argument is that the burden of 
corporate income tax is ultimately carried mainly by employees, followed by consumers and 
shareholders. 
                                                           
25 Lau (2000) applied a varying discount rate according to age for different agents. 
26 For details see Appendix II – General Government Operations, 2004. 
27 The number indicates the percentage of the total revenue. 
28 Some working papers elaborate on Corporate Income Tax more sophisticatedly. See, for example, Auerbach 
and Chang (2003) or see Cardarelli R., Sefton J. and Kotlikoff L. J. (1999) for details.  Generational Accounts in the Czech Republic   13 
 
When inspecting the age-specific profiles we clearly see that the personal income tax and social 
contributions paid by an individual depend on his/her age. It is evident that agents aged between 
18 and 60 earn more than children and pensioners, so the direct taxes paid by this specific age 
group are the highest. Since private consumption evolves in line with income, the same 
conclusion holds for indirect taxes. Thus, value added tax and excises also depend heavily on the 
age of the individual. 
5.2.2 Expenditures 
We found the following expenditure items to be age specific: 
 
  Old-Age Pensions (P) (19.9%) 
  Disability Pensions (DP) (4.2%)
29 
  Unemployment Benefits (UB) (3.4%) 
  Education Expenditures (EE) (10%) 
  Health Expenditures (HE) (15.1%) 
  Sickness Benefits (SB) (2.1%) 
  Other Social Expenditures (OSE) (5.8%) 
  Other Age-Specific Expenditures (OE) (26.5%).  
 
The data concerning all forms of pension benefits comes from the Czech Social Security 
Administration database. The information on Education Expenditures was provided by the 
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports. The General Health Insurance Company provided the 
health care data. As in the case of revenue, the remaining age-specific expenditure profiles were 
obtained from the Household Budget Survey 2002.  
It is assumed that Other Age-Specific Revenues and Other Age-Specific Expenditures are 
distributed evenly over all age groups. First, in a few cases it is hard to even recognize if there is 
any age-specific profile. Second, it is difficult to obtain all the profiles.  
Our study shows that the largest part of age-specific expenditures is other age-specific 
expenditures, i.e. with a flat age profile. This could appear unsatisfactory at first sight, but we 
have to bear in mind that this item is the sum of expenditures on General Public Services, 
Defence, Housing, Public Order and Safety. In our view it is impossible to quantify which age 
group uses more/less of these public expenditures. So, for example, we assume that the level of 
expenditure on defence depends on the size of the population, but not on its age structure. 
 
 
                                                           
29 Other forms of pension benefits (survivor’s pensions) were assigned to old-age. 14   Kamil Dybczak  
 
5.3 Government Purchases 
Government purchases were quantified as a balance of non-age-specific expenditures and non-
age-specific revenues. The ratio of non-age-specific revenues (expenditures) to total revenues 
(expenditures) is about 6.0 (12.9) %.
30 We detected the following revenue items:  
  Property Income (2.5%) 
  Capital Revenue (1.1%) 
  Grants (2.4%) 
 
and the following expenditure items: 
  Fuel and Energy (0.2%) 
  Agriculture and Forestry (2.5%) 
  Mining and Mineral Resources (0.2%) 
  Transport and Communications (10.0%) 
 
not to be dependent on the number of people and their age. The absolute amount of Gt is   
CZK 86 billion in 2004, i.e. the value of non-age-specific expenditures exceeds that of non-age-
specific revenues by CZK 86 billion in 2004.  
5.4 Public Net Wealth and Net Debt 
 
The last but not least item from the intertemporal budget constraint is government net wealth or 
public net debt. There is no difference in applying either net wealth or net debt, but finding the 
appropriate number is not as easy as it seems at first sight. Net wealth is defined as the part of 
assets financed entirely by own resources. In other words it is a potential source of privatization 
revenues. In fact, it is difficult to determine the actual market price of public assets.
31 To 
summarize, the evaluation of public assets is definitely not an easy task. 
 In the case of the Czech Republic the most important government assets are non-financial assets. 
They comprise fixed assets such as roads, public buildings, land and so forth. Unfortunately, the 
size and value of that public property has not been precisely specified in the Czech Republic yet.
32 
The key issue is whether and to what extent these fixed assets could be sold to raise lacking 
revenues. In addition, it is hard to imagine that the government would sell all of its assets.
33  
                                                           
30 For details see Appendix II – General Government Operations, 2004. 
31 As an alternative, some authors try to estimate the market value of public net wealth as the sum of the present 
value of the financial flows from public assets. 
32 Public finances have been growing in deficit since 1995. Regardless of this unfavourable development, net 
public wealth has been rising continually according to the CZSO. Government wealth is rising not because of 
prudent government financial policy, but due to evolving accounting procedures at the CZSO with respect to the 
recording of public assets. 
33 To overcome this problem some authors estimate the value of government wealth that can be privatized. See, 
for example, Gál R.I., Simonovits A., Szabó M. and Tarcali G. (2000). Generational Accounts in the Czech Republic   15 
 
In our view, government net wealth according to the national accounts overestimates the value of 
property which can really be privatized. Unfortunately, no such estimate is available for the Czech 
Republic. As a result, we define Dt as gross public debt less actual privatization revenues and less 
the expected present value of future privatization revenues for the next few years.
34  
6. Results 
Following the standard generational accounting methodology, we quantified the first set of 
generational accounts for the Czech Republic. The analysis covers the entire public sector during 
the period from 2004 to 2150. Because of the differences between the sexes we calculated the 
generational accounts separately for males and females.  
Following the structure of the theoretical part, the generational accounts of the currently living 
agents were computed at the beginning. Consequently, they were applied when both the residual 
and the sustainability approach were followed. Tables 1 and 2 show the present value of the 
remaining lifetime taxes and transfers of a representative agent when labour productivity growth 
is set to 2% and the discount rate to 5%. The different columns represent particular tax and 
revenue items. Finally, the generational accounts of current generations are defined as the sum of 
all columns in Tables 1 and 2.  
Table 1: Generational Accounts and their Components for Females (2004, thousand CZK) 
Age VAT E PIT SSC IT CIT OR P DP SD UB OSE EE HE OE GA2004
0 599 243 260 769 37 234 136 -368 -77 -62 -108 -260 -739 -483 -1298 -1117
5 660 281 301 891 42 271 135 -427 -89 -71 -125 -259 -760 -498 -1286 -933
10 690 304 326 963 46 293 127 -450 -95 -77 -136 -252 -591 -498 -1219 -571
15 720 333 356 1054 49 320 121 -478 -104 -85 -151 -242 -363 -506 -1155 -130
20 751 364 403 1196 54 362 118 -535 -117 -93 -159 -230 -134 -531 -1127 321
25 720 356 428 1275 54 384 111 -577 -125 -88 -140 -207 0 -530 -1059 602
30 673 339 438 1308 53 394 104 -640 -134 -75 -117 -182 0 -533 -997 631
35 640 329 440 1303 54 395 101 -751 -148 -66 -99 -156 0 -564 -970 508
40 583 308 403 1167 54 362 95 -846 -156 -58 -80 -118 0 -578 -912 224
45 529 282 337 940 53 303 89 -967 -157 -50 -60 -79 0 -591 -856 -227
50 459 240 245 656 49 220 81 -1085 -142 -36 -37 -51 0 -580 -779 -758
55 384 193 143 365 43 128 73 -1213 -115 -20 -13 -37 0 -559 -701 -1329
60 309 152 55 127 37 49 65 -1169 -92 -6 0 -29 0 -527 -620 -1649
65 244 120 12 19 29 10 56 -1005 -73 0 0 -25 0 -480 -531 -1624
70 192 93 0 0 22 0 46 -802 -54 0 0 -20 0 -410 -436 -1369
75 148 71 0 0 17 0 36 -598 -36 0 0 -13 0 -326 -342 -1043
80 112 53 0 0 13 0 27 -423 -21 0 0 -7 0 -248 -257 -752
85 80 38 0 0 10 0 19 -290 -12 0 0 -5 0 -183 -184 -527
90 55 26 0 0 7 0 13 -188 -8 0 0 -4 0 -131 -127 -355
9 5 3 9 1 8 00509 - 1 1 6 - 600- 30 - 9 2 - 8 9 - 2 3 3
1 0 0 1 6 700204 - 4 1 - 300- 10 - 3 7 - 3 6 - 9 0  
 
Note: Value Added Tax (VAT), Excises (E), Personal Income Tax (PIT), Social Security Contributions 
(SSC), Inheritance Tax (IT), Corporate Income Tax (CIT), Other Age-Specific Revenues (OR), 
Old-Age Pensions (P), Disability Pensions (DP), Unemployment Benefits (UB), Education 
Expenditures (EE), Health Expenditures (HE), Sick Benefits (SB), Other Social Expenditures 
(OSE), Other Age-Specific Expenditures (OE). 
 
                                                           
34 The estimates of current and future privatization revenues come from the document: Projection of Revenues 
and Expenditure in 2006. The document offers a rough estimate of privatization revenues in 2006 and 2007. 16   Kamil Dybczak  
 
Table 2: Generational Accounts and their Components for Males (2004, thousand CZK) 
Age VAT E PIT SSC IT CIT OR P DP SD UB OSE EE HE OE GA2004
0 572 231 361 1068 36 325 143 -358 -81 -68 -118 -262 -747 -526 -1363 -789
5 624 265 416 1230 41 374 140 -413 -93 -78 -134 -262 -760 -522 -1337 -509
10 642 283 444 1313 44 399 131 -426 -99 -84 -145 -248 -588 -501 -1248 -83
15 663 307 482 1425 47 433 122 -441 -106 -92 -159 -229 -359 -495 -1167 432
20 687 333 543 1611 51 488 117 -482 -118 -100 -167 -210 -132 -515 -1121 987
25 658 326 577 1716 51 518 109 -510 -124 -95 -147 -186 0 -521 -1043 1330
30 616 311 582 1729 50 523 102 -562 -134 -82 -124 -163 0 -541 -977 1331
35 592 307 567 1667 50 509 100 -670 -152 -71 -109 -143 0 -598 -953 1096
40 535 286 505 1449 49 453 92 -747 -162 -61 -89 -114 0 -621 -880 695
45 481 266 438 1210 48 393 85 -855 -170 -54 -70 -81 0 -648 -814 228
50 414 233 351 935 44 315 76 -956 -163 -44 -48 -52 0 -646 -725 -266
55 344 195 251 655 39 226 67 -1102 -141 -28 -23 -35 0 -634 -640 -826
60 273 155 140 362 33 126 58 -1186 -106 -11 0 -24 0 -599 -556 -1335
65 212 119 43 113 27 38 49 -1100 -77 0 0 -16 0 -545 -472 -1608
70 162 90 0 14 21 0 41 -899 -53 0 0 -9 0 -467 -387 -1488
75 122 68 0 0 14 0 32 -689 -33 0 0 -4 0 -376 -307 -1174
80 92 51 0 0 10 0 25 -515 -19 0 0 -3 0 -288 -238 -884
85 69 39 0 0 7 0 19 -377 -11 0 0 -2 0 -212 -179 -647
90 51 29 0 0 6 0 14 -255 -6 0 0 -2 0 -155 -132 -450
95 37 21 0 0 4 0 10 -156 -4 0 0 -1 0 -112 -96 -297
1 0 0 1 5 800204 - 5 1 - 20000 - 4 4 - 3 8 - 1 0 7  
 
Note: Value Added Tax (VAT), Excises (E), Personal Income Tax (PIT), Social Security Contributions 
(SSC), Inheritance Tax (IT), Corporate Income Tax (CIT), Other Age-Specific Revenues (OR), 
Old-Age Pensions (P), Disability Pensions (DP), Unemployment Benefits (UB), Education 
Expenditures (EE), Health Expenditures (HE), Sick Benefits (SB), Other Social Expenditures 
(OSE), Other Age-Specific Expenditures (OE). 
 
 The same, but aggregated, information is depicted in Figure 1. The horizontal axis represents the 
age of the agent in 2004. The vertical axis depicts the average remaining lifetime net tax burden 
(generational account) of each current generation. In other words, the vertical axis shows the 
cumulated present value of all taxes and transfers which is paid by a representative agent of 
different age between 2004 and the end of his/her life. To be more specific, the average male who 
is 30 years old in 2004 will pay taxes and receive transfers for an additional 70 years. As a result 
he accumulates a surplus whose present value is about CZK 1,331,000 in 2004. Put differently, 
such a male on average pays CZK 1,331,000 more on taxes than he receives in benefits over the 
rest of his life (between years 30 to 100), without taking into account previous taxes paid and 
expenditures received (between years 0 and 29). By contrast, an average male at the age of 70 in 
2004 accumulates a deficit of CZK 1,488,000 over the next 30 years, i.e. the government pays 
him CZK 1,488,000 more than he pays in taxes (between years 70 and 100). 
To help the reader get through all the numbers easily it is important to realize where all the 
characteristics can be found. Since we are interested in comparing the accounts of current and 
future generations, we only take into account generations that last a whole life cycle. In the case 
of currently living generations there is only one possibility, i.e. we concentrate on the generation 
which came into existence in 2004. The generational account of agents born in 2004 of both sexes 
can be found in the first row and the last column of Tables 1 and 2 (-1117 and -789). Actually, the 
last columns of Tables 1 and 2 are depicted in Figure 1. The overall generational account, which 
neglects the differences between the sexes, is a weighted average of the generational accounts of 
males and females (the dashed line). Since Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1 show calculations based 
on the growth rate set to 2% and the discount rate set to 5%, the same numbers can also be found 
in Table 3. 
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It is possible to draw some important conclusions using the tables and the figure. The significant 
part of Figure 1 lies below zero. This means that the significant part of the current population gets 
more from the public budget than it pays in taxes during its remaining lifetime. In other words, 
only people aged approximately from 12 to 45 (in 2004) will produce a positive difference 
between remaining lifetime taxes and transfers. By contrast, the rest of the population will 
generate a deficit. If we take into account population ageing and the worsening age structure, the 
current system of taxes and transfers looks unsustainable even when checking the figure visually.  
The generational account of a representative agent who was born in 2004 is negative, i.e. the 
agent will obtain more from the public budget than he/she will pay over his/her entire lifespan. 
When the discount rate equals 5% and labour productivity growth equals 2%, the generational 
account of a representative agent born in 2004 is CZK -948,000. In other words, each agent born 
in 2004 will on average cumulate a lifetime deficit whose present value in 2004 is CZK -948,000. 
If the government cannot finance these deficits using extra revenue sources, intergenerational 
shifts of the fiscal burden are expected. So, even without quantifying the generational accounts of 
future generations and the sustainability gap we can say that the current fiscal policy leads to an 
intergenerational redistribution of the fiscal burden and should be changed. 
The difference between the male and female generational accounts seems to be important. We 
admit that addressing the differences between the sexes is not the main goal of our analysis. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to realize how differences in position on the labour market, 
consumption behaviour etc. can influence the sustainability of public finances. Figure 1 shows 
that the average man born in 2004 accumulates a lifetime deficit lower than that of the average 
woman by almost CZK 330,000 in terms of the year 2004.  
When building generational accounts, we explicitly assume that age- and gender-adjusted absolute 
per capita taxes and transfers grow in relation to labour productivity growth. Moreover, to make 
the different generational accounts comparable we have to discount future values to the base year 18   Kamil Dybczak  
 
2004. Thus, the present value of future taxes and transfers depends heavily on the size of the 
discount rate and the labour productivity growth rate.
35 Introducing different values of the two key 
parameters affects the results as shown in Table 3.  
Table 3: Generational Accounts of Current and Future Generations under Different Scenarios 
(thousand CZK) 
g  ( % ) 123
r  ( % ) 357357357
GA current -1081 -902 -862 -1497 -948 -883 -2629 -1090 -904
GA future 2761 2021 1682 4655 2910 2122 8534 4512 2849
Sustainability gap (%GDP) 454 211 131 797 297 131 1608 460 214  
 
When testing the sensitivity of fiscal sustainability with respect to g and r, we found the following 
conclusions. Increasing productivity growth leads to the gap between public expenditures and 
revenues broadening.
36  Putting it simply, both taxes and transfers are indexed by the same 
measure. So the gap, whether positive or negative, grows at the same rate if the structure and size 
of the population are not changing. Unfortunately, in the case of the Czech Republic the gap is 
negative, and demographic development will make the situation even worse.  
 The higher the discount rate the lower the generational account of current generations. The same 
conclusion applies to the size of the generational account of future generations and to the 
sustainability gap. Since the discount rate is used to translate future values into present terms, a 
higher r improves the current value of future deficits.  
In all cases of different g and r the present value of the net tax burden of a representative agent is 
negative, i.e. this agent obtains more transfers than pays in taxes over his/her whole lifetime. By 
contrast, the generational accounts of future generations, calculated using the residual approach, 
are positive. This implies that next generations will face the opposite situation to currently living 
generations from the tax and transfer point of view. The higher generational account of future 
generations indicates that the present fiscal policy is not sustainable and should be changed. 
 If the structure of public revenues and expenditures is held fixed and the demography develops in 
accordance with our projection, we estimate the sustainability gap to be positive regardless of the 
combination of g and r. The sustainability gap indicates the size of the adjustment needed to 
achieve fiscal sustainability, i.e. it is defined as the accumulated present value of future deficits 
owing to changes in demography parameters and unchanged fiscal policy between 2004 and 
2150.
37 For example, if the discount rate equals 5% and productivity grows at 2%, the government 
accumulates debt of 297% of 2004 GDP between 2004 and 2150, as presented in Table 3. If g 
increases by just 1 percentage point to 3%, the ratio of the sustainability gap to GDP rises to 
460% ceteris paribus. It seems that indexation of taxes and benefits is an important factor for the 
potential development of public finances. 
                                                           
35 The problems of choosing g and r are discussed in section 5.2. 
36 The sentence holds if revenues and expenditures are strictly indexed on labour productivity growth. Under this 
condition and applying our approach we could say that productivity growth does not help. But we have to be 
cautious. It is tempting to say that this paper finds the current fiscal policy settings to be unsustainable when 
indexed to productivity growth. Again we have to stress that our approach lacks the reaction of the rest of the 
economy to fiscal policy and vice versa. 
37 The level of the sustainability gap is presented in relation to GDP. Generational Accounts in the Czech Republic   19 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s generational accounts have been constructed for many countries 
all over the world. To give the reader some idea about the situation in other countries we present 
part of the results from Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1998) and Gál, Simonovits, Szabó and 
Tarcali (2000).
38 All the results are calculated setting g to 1.5% and r to 5%.  







United States 159 22 97
Japan 337 77 309
Germany 156 -8 81
Italy 223 18 98
Sweden -31 -67 -45
Belgium 107 63 -218
Hungary 424 119 384
Czech Republic 248 152 226  
Note: In the case of the Czech Republic the base year is set to 2004. The rest of the data relates to 1995. 
 
Comparing the results on the sustainability gap to GDP in Table 4 for different countries, we can 
draw the following conclusions. First, The No Demographic Change scenario indicates how large 
the sustainability gap would be if the size and structure of the population remain stable. Table 4 
demonstrates that changing demography seems to be a significant factor which negatively affects 
the intergenerational imbalance in all the countries. Second, leaving aside the impact of public 
debt alleviates the intergenerational imbalance. But its extent, except in the case of Belgium, 
appears to be substantially smaller than that of changing demography. The equivalent outcome 
holds in the case of the Czech Republic, i.e. the impact of changing population size and structure 
exceeds the impact of zero initial debt. Third, in the case of the Czech Republic the difference 
between the Baseline scenario and the No Demographic Change value seems to be smaller. It 
appears that there are other important factors in addition to worsening demographic conditions. As 
already mentioned, the intergenerational imbalance would not disappear with higher labour 
productivity growth. This indicates that the system of taxes and transfers in the Czech Republic 
faces structural problems, i.e. under the current set-up of public revenues and expenditures the 
system of public finances is predetermined to generate deficit financing.
39 In addition, the impact 
of demographic factors aggravates the fiscal/ intergenerational imbalance. 
To sketch the potential impact of intentional adjustments in taxes and transfers, we present 
mechanistic simulations of the impact of a variation in selected age-specific profiles on 
intergenerational redistribution and fiscal sustainability. On the revenue side a 10% increase in the 
age-specific profile of value added tax (VAT) and personal income tax (PIT) is introduced. On the 
expenditure side a 10% decrease in the age-specific profile of old-age pensions (P) and health 
expenditures (HE) is introduced. In other words a representative agent will pay/obtain 10% 
                                                           
38 We are conscious of the fact that the generational accounts methodology is not unified. In addition, the results 
concerning countries other than the Czech Republic are almost ten years old. This means that important changes 
relating to demography and fiscal policy could have occurred since that time. 
39 Even if no negative demographic factors come into effect. See, for example, Bezdek, Dybczak and Krejdl 
(2003). 20   Kamil Dybczak  
 
more/less in absolute terms compared to the baseline scenario.
40 The results are presented in Table 
5. Indeed, all of the presented scenarios improve the intergenerational imbalance and fiscal 
sustainability indicators. The improvement appears to be significant, but not sufficient. The 
combination of all the refinements reduces the ratio of the sustainability gap to GDP by almost 
100 percentage points. This is still not enough to solve the problems of intergenerational 
redistribution and fiscal sustainability. We should stress again the pure mechanistic nature of these 
results. 
Table 5: The Impact of a 10% Adjustment in Taxes and Transfers (thousand CZK) 
 
Baseline ↑ VAT ↑ PIT ↓P ↓HE TOTAL
GA current -948 -889 -917 -912 -897 -771
GA future 2910 1613 1673 1535 1604 1079
Sustainability gap (%GDP) 297 275 284 269 274 204  
 
Finally, Table 6 presents information about the impact of changing demographic factors on the 
generational accounts of future agents. The results indicate the present value of the growth-
adjusted net taxes of a representative future agent which guarantees fiscal sustainability.
41 
According to our calculations, it is evident that the generational account of the future agent 
increases over time in the case of the Czech Republic. Moreover, if no changes in taxes and 
transfers are undertaken, the per capita burden of future agents necessary to restore fiscal 
sustainability will almost double during the next 15 years. 
Table 6: Growth-Adjusted Generational Accounts of Future Generations in Different Years 
(thousand CZK) 
2004 2009 2014 2019
GA future 1782 2265 2845 3531
base year=100 100 127 160 198  
 
The timing of fiscal reform is therefore a very important factor from the intergenerational point of 
view, since the population is getting smaller and older. In other words, the number of people 
really facing the burden accumulated by previous generations is decreasing. This implies that the 
government should not hesitate too long with revising the current system if it wishes to sustain 
fiscal policy without dramatic changes in taxes and transfers of future generations. The costs of 
delayed action seem to be considerable. 
                                                           
40 As well as in most of the presented results g=2% and r=5%. 
41 The results are calculated by applying the residual approach. For details see section 4. Generational Accounts in the Czech Republic   21 
 
7. Conclusions 
We have presented the first set of generational accounts for the Czech Republic. By contrast with 
traditional indicators such as the budget deficit and public debt, generational accounts are forward 
looking and provide us with information about potential intergenerational redistribution and the 
sustainability of public finances. The generational accounting approach captures sustainability 
from both the aggregated macroeconomic and representative agent’s point of view.  
We show that the present fiscal policy is not sustainable, owing to the unequal treatment of 
current and future representative agents. According to our analysis a representative living agent 
born in 2004 obtains more benefits than he/she pays in taxes over the rest of his/her life. By 
contrast, a representative agent not yet born will face the opposite situation. Moreover, the total 
amount of government liabilities resulting from the current fiscal policy pursued to 2150 reaches 
about 300% of GDP in 2004. Thus, taking into account future demographic development and a 
strict indexation rule, fiscal policy appears to be unsustainable. Finally, according to our results, 
the costs of postponed modification of taxes and benefits seem to be considerable, because of the 
worsening demographic factors. 
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Appendix I  
General Government Operations, 2004 (GFS 1986 Methodology)  
(billions of CZK) 
 
TAX REVENUE 963 General Public Services 78
Income Profits & Capital Gains Tax 253 Defense 51
Individual 133 Public Order & Safety 39
Corporate 120 Education 116
Social Security Contributions 388 Health 175
Taxes on Property 15 Social Security & Welfare 356
Domestic Taxes On Goods & Services 302 old age pension 231
General Sales, Turnover & Value-Added Taxes 182 sick benefits  25
Excises 96 social security benefits 33
Taxes on Special Services 1 other benefits 43
Taxes on Use of Goods & Services 16 passive employment policy 7
Other Taxes on Goods & Services 7 welfare 15
Taxes on International  Trade & Transactions 4 Other  10
Import Duties 4 Housing & Community Amenities 84
Other Taxes 0 Recreation, Cultural & Religious Affairs & Services 30
NONTAX REVENUE 62 Fuel and Energy 3
Entrepreneurial & Property Income 27 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 29
Administrative Fees & Charges,  Nonind.and 
Incidental Sales 24
Mining & Mineral Resources, Manufacturing &  
Construction 3
Fines & Forfeits 4 Transportation & Communication 116
Other Nontax Revenue 7 Other Economic Affairs & Services 36
CAPITAL REVENUE 12 Other Expenditures 45
GRANTS 25
TOTAL REVENUE 1 062 TOTAL EXPENDITURE  1 160
DEFICIT -98
DEBT 659 
Age Specific Revenue 998 Age Specific Expenditure 1 010
Income Profits & Capital Gains Tax 253 General Public Services 78
Social Security Contributions 388 Defense 51
Taxes on Property 15 Public Order & Safety 39
Domestic Taxes On Goods & Services 302 Education 116
Taxes on International  Trade & Transactions 4 Health 175
Other Taxes 0 Social Security & Welfare 356
Administrative Fees & Charges 24 Housing & Community Amenities 84
Fines & Forfeits 4 Recreation, Cultural & Religious Affairs & Services 30
Other Nontax Revenue 7 Other Economic Affairs & Services 36
Other Expenditures 45
Non-age specific revenue 64 Non-age specific expenditure 150
Entrepreneurial & Property Income 27 Fuel and Energy 3
Capital Revenue 12 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 29
Grants 25 Mining & Mineral Resources, Manufacturing &  Cons 3
0 0 Transportation & Communication 116
TOTAL REVENUE 1 062 TOTAL EXPENDITURE  1 160 
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Appendix II 
Age-Specific Taxes and Transfers (thousand CZK) 
 
The major part of the age-specific profiles of a representative male and female were calculated 
using the Household Budget Survey 2002 provided by the Czech Statistical Office. Data 
concerning all forms of pension benefits comes from the Czech Social Security Administration 
database. Data reflecting Education Expenditures was provided by the Ministry of Education, 
Youth and Sports. Finally, the General Health Insurance Company provided the health care data. 
The presented age-specific taxes and transfers give us an idea of people’s behaviour during their 
lifecycle. Moreover, we can infer from their level and shape how people contribute to the public 
budget or benefit from public transfers depending on their age. For example, the amount of direct 
taxes (Personal Income Tax and Social Security Contributions) depends on an individual's wage 
rate and employment. First, in the neoclassical framework, the real wage rate is a function of 
labour productivity. Many factors can influence the productivity of labour, but we assume it 
depends mainly on the stock of human capital accumulated by an employee, i.e. experience 
accumulated over time. Generally, young people increase the stock of their human capital more 
easily than older people. Moreover, the stock of capital depreciates over time, and if no new 
experience is added the capital stock decreases. This implies that an employee becomes less 
productive and his/her real wage rate potentially falls. Usually, older people are not capable of 
adjusting to new conditions and their stock of human capital just decreases due to depreciation. In 
other words, the real wage rate seems to depend on the age of the employee, i.e. it increases with 
age for the young and decreases for the old. Second, people start working after finishing at least 
the statutory level of education. Usually, they stop working after reaching retirement age. Thus, 
when applying the provided arguments the shape of the age-specific profiles of direct taxes can be 
explained. It follows that the amount of personal income tax and social security contributions paid 
by an individual depends on his/her age.  
The shape of the age-specific profiles of indirect taxes can be explained as follows. The 
consumption of a representative agent develops according to his/her needs and the level of his/her 
income. As a result, the amount of indirect taxes (VAT and Excises) is either low or zero for 
children. Then, as income increases, the amount of goods consumed increases, as does the amount 
of indirect taxes. Finally, as an agent retires, he/she starts consuming accumulated savings and 
lowers consumption. 
The government redistributes income among individuals using public expenditures and transfers. 
In many cases public expenditures and transfers depend on the size and age structure of the 
population. It follows that age-specific profiles of different public expenditure items can be 
constructed as well. For example, the government provides retired people with old-age pensions. 
If an individual does not reach a certain age, he/she cannot consume these pensions. By contrast, 
the government finances a substantial part of education expenditures, but after reaching a specific 
age, an individual has to finance education by himself. Next, government health expenditures are 
affected by the sickness rate of different age groups. Usually, the government pays more for 
children and old people, since their sickness rate is higher than that of people of productive age. 
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